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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Mr. Moore was Denied his Federal and State Constitutional Rights to a
S ~ e e d vTrial.
'

Both Mr. Moore and the state agree as to the standard ofreview. Appellant's Opening
Brief, p. 4; Respondent's Brief, p. 4. And, both agree that the balancing test of Bavlcev 11. Wingo,
407 U.S. 5 14, 92 S.Ct. 2 182 (i
972), is used to determine whether the federal and state'
constit~~tioual
rights have been violated. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; Respondent's Brief, p.
5. And, there is no dispute that the Bavlcev factors are 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for
the delay; 3) the defenda~it'sassertion of the right to speedy trial; and 4) the prejudice occasioned
by the delay. Barlcev v. Wiizgo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct at 2192; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 838,
835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2005)
Where Mr. Moore and tlie state differ is in the application of the law to the facts of this
case. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; Respondent's Brief, p. 5. But, as set out in Mr. Moore's
Opening Brief, analysis of the Bavlcer factors in this case leads to the conclusion that there was a
rights to speedy trial.
violation of the state and fedeval co~istitutio~lal
1. Length of Delay
Both Mr. Moore and the state agree that the length of the delay in this case triggers
judicial review.' Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; Respondent's Brief p. 5. However, there is
one difference in the analysis of Mr. Moore and that ofthe state. The state argues that delay of
16 months between Mr. Moore's arrest and the time he filed his motion to dismiss "is not
excessive." Unspoken is the state's assumption that the actual delay between arrest and

'

Counsel apologizes to the Court and the state for an arithmetic error in the Opening
Brief. There are 16 months, not 18 months, between September 2006 and January 2008.

resolution of the inotion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial, 22 months, is also "not
excessive." In support of its position, the state cites two cases, State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705,
708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983), and State v. Taliitage, 104 Idalio 249, 252,658 P.2d
920, 923 (1983). Canrpbell involved a delay of 12 moilths, just over % of the delay involved in
illis case by the time the motion to dismiss was decided, and Talnrage involved a delay of 7.5
months, ahout 113 of the total delay involved in this case. Neither case makes any statement that
a 22 month total delay is not excessive. Moreover, other case law does not support the state's
co~lclusionthat a delay of 16 months to nearly two years "is not excessive." To the contray,

Stale v. Lopez, 144 Idalio 349, 353, 160 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007), held that a delay of 17
months in a case charging three feloilies was "unreasonable" and weighed significantly against
the state in analyzing whether there had been a constitutional violation.
While the state may not believe that requiring a defendant to wait 22 months before his
inotion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial is even decided and ultimately wait 2 years and 3
months between arrest and a plea entry date, llle case law does not support that position.
Likewise, cornillon sensibility does not support the idea that a pel-son sho~ildhave to wait nearly
2 years for a case to be resolved by entry of a plea.
2. Reason for the Delay
Both Mr. Moore and the state agree that, in evaluating the reasons for a delay, different
weights are assigned to different reasons. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho at 836, 118 P.3d at 168.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6; Respondent's Brief, p. 6. However, Mr. Moore and the state
disagree on the basic question of who is responsible for bringing a criminal defendant to trial in a
timely fashion.

h~ its brief, the state does not attempt to argue that it had good reason for the delay in this
case. Rather, the state bases its argu~nentregarding the reasons for the delay around the theme
that "Moore has failed to show that the delay was not the result of his own actions, much Less
that it was the state that caused the delay" and on the theme that Mr. Moore has not provided a
s~fficientappellate record and that what record he has supplied indicates an implicit voluntarq'
waiver of speedy trial. Respondent's Brief, p. 6 - 9.
The state's first theme is premised on the misconception that it is the defendant's
responsibility to bring a case to trial in a timely manner. That is the opposite of the law. "The
prosecution and the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that cases are brought to trial in
a timely manner." State v. Lopez, 144 Ida110 at 355, 160 P.3d at 1300, citing Barlcev v. Wingo,
407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. The ultimate respotlsibility for co~nplyingwith the
constitutio~lsof the United States and the State of Idaho in this regard rests with the stale rather
t11m the defendant. State v. Lopez, s t p m , citing Bnr,Icer, 407 U.S. at 53 1, 92 S.Ct. at 2 192, and

State v. Llavis, 141 Idaho at 835, 118 P.3d at 169. See also, Slate v. Clavk, 135 Idaho 255, 258,
I6 P.3d 931, 934 (2000) (the speedy trial statute mandates that the state must show good cause
for a delay greater than six months)
It was not Mr. Moore's dnty to demonstrate that he was not the cause of the delay in this
case. It was the state's duty to denlonstrate, given that the case was delayed so long that there
was a presumptive violation of the state and federal constitutions, that there were substantial
reasons to justify the delay. State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 11, 27 P.3d 417,420 (Ct. App.
2001). See also, State v. Lurid 124 Ida110 290, 292, 858 P.2d 829, 831 (Ct. App. 1993).
As discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, the District Court found three reasons for the

delay: 1) the state's lack of diligence in researching Mr. Moore's prior history; 2) Mr. Moor6 first
requesting a court trial and then requesting a jury trial; and 3) the fact that the trial was scheduled
to acco~nmodatethe schedule of one of the state's witnesses. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7.
Mr. Moore has argued that the first reason, lack of diligence, weighs against a finding of good
cause. Appellant's Ope~iingBrief, p. 7. Mr. Moore has further argued that the District Court
elred in attributing any of the delay to his initial request for a cowl trial and later request for a
jury trial. This argume~lthas two bases. First, the case law that holds that tile speedy trial rule is
designed to acconimodate a reasonable number of pretrial motions and the existence of those
motions does not constitute gr0~111ds
for delaying a trial. State v. Stuavt, 113 Idaho 494,745 P.2d
1 I I5 (Ct. App. 1987). Second, a speedy trial violation occurred long before Mr. Moore changed
his request from that for a court trial to a jury trial. His change of request one year after he
entered a not guilty plea was not a factot. in the violatio~l, Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7 - 8.
And, lastly, Mr. Moore has argued, based upon State v. Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 170,
that the setting of the trial around the witness's schedule does not constitute a valid cause for the
delay of a trial. Appellant's Opening Brief, 9 - 10.
!

The state has chosen not to fully address these reasons for the delay. The state does not

j
even mention tile second two reasons for the delay in its brief - the supposed impact of Mr.
Moore's request for a court trial and the scheduling of the case around a witness schedule.
i
!

I

Respondent's Brief, p. 6 - 9. And, with regard to the first reason, lack of diligence by the state in
researching Mr. Moore's history, the state inakes the argument that this was not a problem.

!

!
j

Without any explanation, the state puts forth that there is no speedy trial issue with amendments
of the charges that continue for 18 months -the first amendinent on March 1, 2007, was six

j
4

months after the arrest; tile second amendment was on January 4, 2008, 16 inonths after the
arrest, a i ~ dthe final information was not filed until March 24,2008, a full 18 months after the
arrest. The state dismisses any concern that this long delay in even figuring out what to charge
was problematic stating, "Moore is only speculating that [the delay in the proceedings] had
something to do with the amendment. Likewise, the state filed the felony complain on January 4,
2008. No doubt this caused some delay as it necessitated the holding or waiving of a preliminary
hearing, but . . . there is nothing in the record to suggest tliat this delay was or would have been
sig~~ificant."Responderlt's Brief, p. 9. While the state may not see any connection between its
failure to fignre out liow to charge Mr. Moore for 18 moiiths and the fact tliat there was a denial
of speedy trial, such a connection is obvious and is a violation of the federal and state
constitutions.
f i e state's second theme, that Mr. Moore lias not preseiiied a sufficieiit appellate record
and that what record he did supply indicates an ilnplicit voluntary waiver of speedy trial, is
preiliised on a inisreading of the record and the case law.
The state first cites a reference made by the District Court on June 12, 2008.
The District Court stated:
Because there is a pretrial ineinoraiiduin that's been filed in the case - I'm a little
unclear as to Ciie date of that. I know the pretrial, accordiiig to the trial scheduling
notice, was set for January of 2007. But it states, 'set for court trial. Offer
extended. Possible resolution prior to trial. Order an evaluation.' Both counsel
signed that, so it appears there was a waiver of a jury trial fi-0111tlie pretrial - . . .

Tr. 6/12/08, p. 4, In. 18-20.
From this the state argues on appeal, that there are "pretrial memoranda" that are not in
the appellate record that indicate that Mr Moore stipulated or acquiesced in setting over the July

23, 2007, trial date for sentencing in September 2007. Respondent's Brief, p. 8 - 9. However, the
memorandum the District Court was referring to is in the Clerk's Record at page 41. It is in fact
undated, and slates only those words quoted by the District Court The pre-trial menloraildum,
which was not signed by Mr. Moore, sets no trial date or sentencrng date and does not include
any indication whatsoever of any waiver of speedy trial. Note also, despite the state's argument
that this Court should infer from this document a waiver of Mr. Moore's right to speedy trial.
waiver is a voluntary relinquishment or abandomnent of a lcnown right or privilege and courts
should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352,
160 P.3d at 1287, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 525,92 S.Ct. at 2189. Courts "should not
presume accjr~iescencein the loss of fundamental rights." Bnrlcer v. Wiizgo, sulmz. Waiver cannot
e d a docuineilt that does not set a trial date, does not include any language
be i n f e ~ ~ from
whatsoever indicating an intent to waive speedy trial, and is not signed bythe defendant. Barlcer
v. Wingo, supra; Stale v.Lopez, supm.

The state next refers to this statement by the District Court on June 12, 2008:
Then, on July 23'd which was the time set for the court trial -- there is a document
'
Boise City was there; defense
here called a 'Pretrial ~ e m o r a n d u mreflecting
couilsel was there through the Public Defender's Office. And it says, 'Sentencing
set for September 121h,2007, at 3:45 p.m.' before the judge. Albert Moore signed
it. Charlene Davis for the Defense. . . .
Tr. 6/12/08,p. 6, in. 19 - 25. Respondent's Brief, p. 8 -9
While the state argues that this statement by the Court indicates a stipulation or
acquiescence in a violatiovl of speedy trial, this is contraly to the record. The pretrial
metnorandum cited by the District Court is at page 99 of the Clerk's Record. That mernorandu~n
does not inc1ude a waiver of speedy trial. Per Lopez, above, waiver is not to he inferred and this

document actually deinonstrates no more than that Mr. Moore was infonned that sentencing had
been set for September 12,2007. It does not indicate in aiiy way tliat he agreed to that date or
was instrumental in choosing that date.
The state next refers to a statement in the June 12, 2008, hearing wherein the Court
referred to a pretrial memorandum which reset the trial to February 15, 2008. Respondent's
Brief, p. 9, citing Tr. 6/12/08, p. 8, in. 25 - p. 9, In. 15. The state claims in its brief that this
pretrial memorandum sl~owsthat Mr. Moore requested that the December 2007 trial date he
reset. However, the pretrial rnernorandum, which is at page 102 of the Clerk's Record, states:
"Reset PTC & JT. Defendant to make motion to dismiss. Offer conveyed." Contrary to the
state's assertions in its brief, this document does not in aiiy way indicate that the trial dates were
reset per Mr. Moore's request. Rather, it just states that Mr. Moore intends to inalce a motion to
dismlss. And, again, the document does not contain any reference to any waiver of speedy trial
rights and suc11 waiver is not to be inferred. R 102, Stale v.Lopez, szipm.
'The state next refers to a statement in the June 12 hearing wherein the District Court said
that Mr. Moore failed to appear for an arraiyi~nentor preliminary hearing in January 2008.
Respondent's Brief, p. 9, citing Tr. 6/12/08, p. 10, In. 7 - p. 11, In. 25. However, the ROA does
not reflect the doculllent cited by the District Court as ever having been in the record. Rather, the
ROA indicates that there was an arraignment on January 23, 2008, and at that tilve trial was set
for Fehn~aly7, 2008. ROA p. 3. Note, however, that the Clerk's Record at page 43, states that
there was a failure to appear on Feh~uary4, 2008. R 43. There is no explanation in the record as
to why the ROA and the actual docuinents in the Clerk's Record are not in agreement. However,
there is no indicationin either place that there was a waiver of speedy trial. Slate v. Lopez, supra.

And, lastly, the state cites the District Court's stateinent that the record shows that on
March 6, 2008, there was a request for a set over. Tr. 6/12/08, p. 11, in. 22 - p. 12, in. 5.
Respondent' Brief, p. 9. The state argues that this indicates that Mr. Moore either requested or
acquiesced in setting over the preliminary hearing. Again, however, the record to which the
District Comt referred, is in the Clerk's Record at page 49. That document, magistrate court
minutes, does not indicate who requested the set over or whether there was an objection to it.
Further, the minutes make absolutely no indication that Mr. Moore explicitly or even implicitly
agreed to waive speedy trial. R 49.
While the state is insistent that the record supplied on appeal was deficient, the materials
the state claims were missing are in fact in the Clerk's Record. Moreover, ilolie of those
materials denionstrate a waiver of speedy trial.
As set out in the Opening Brief, the reasons for the delay in this case were not sufficient
to overcome a finding that there was a violation of the state and federal constitulional rights to
speedy trial.
3 . Assertioi? ojthe Right to Speedy Pin1
As set out in Mr. Moore's Opening Brief, he asserted his right to speedy trial via a motion
to dismiss filed 16 months after he was arrested. Elowever, even once he filed his motion to
dismiss, he was forced to wail another six months just for a decisioil on that motion. Mr. Moore
asserts that this delay weighs against a finding that there was no constitutional violation.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12 - 11.'

Mr. Moore has now been able to review the videotape of his initial arraignment. Mr.
Moore did not waive or invoke speedy trial at that proceeding. Augmented Appellate Record.
8

The state argues that Mr. Moore's motion was an assertion of only the statutory right to
speedy trial and, that at any rate, its timing indicates that, "he was seeking to talte advantage of
delay rather than being truly interested in going to trial." Respondent's Brief, p. 10. However,
both Mr. Moore's Brief in Support of his Motion to Dismiss aud the District Court's
Memorandum Opinion make clear that Mr. Moore asserted both his constitutional and statutory
rights. Exhibit on Appeal, Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; R 107 - 112. The
state is simply wrong when it argues that Mr. Moore did not assert his constitutional rights to
speedy trial.
Additionally, the record does not demonstrate that Mr. Moore was not interested in going
to trial. There is nowhere in the record where Mr. Moore states that he does not want this case
resolved. And, to imply that from a motion to dismiss is at best a stretch and at worst a mischaracterization of Mr. Moore's motion. Naturally, Mr. Moore would have preferred to have his
case dismissed, thus eliminating the need to go to trail at all. Tllat does not mean that he did not
want a speedy trial if a trial was needed.
Mr. Moore did assert his right to speedy trial. But, even if he had not, the onus was on
the state and the court to bring this case to resolution within the speedy trial requirements of the
state and federal constitutions. State 11. Lopez, 144 ldaho at 355, 160 P.3d at 1300, citing Barkcer
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191.

Lastly, as set out in State 11. Dillfll-d, 110 Idaho 834, 843,718 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Ct. App.
1986), the statutoly right to speedy trial is self-executing. The defendant does not have to assert
his right to a speedy trial or affirmatively request a trial setting within the speedy trial period.
In sum, Mr. Moore did assert his right to speedy trial through his motion to dismiss.

Regardless of what the state believis might have been his secret motivations for filing a motio~l
to dismiss, the fact remains that the state and court had a duty to bring this case to trial in a
timely fashion. The failure to do so violated the state and federal constitutions. Moreover, even
ifthis Court is inclined to somehow count agalnst Mr. Moore the fact that his motion to dismiss
was not filed ul~til16 months had passed since his ail-est,there remained a six month period of
waiting for the District Couri to even rule on his motion to dismiss. That time of waiting alone
weighs heavily against a finding that there was 110speedy trial violatio~i

4. Pvejudice
The District Court recognized the anxiety and uncertainty suffered by Mr. Moore as a
result of the delay in this case. R 111 - 112. However, the state dismisses this prejudice
asserting that anxiety and uncertainty are inevitable in every case. From this the state goes on to
argue that if anxiety and ~ulcertaintyare the only prejudice suffered by a defendant, then the

i!

factor of prejudice should weigh against a finding o f a violation of the right to speedy trial

1

Respondent's Brief, p. 11 - 12.

I

This argument is in conflict with Doggett v. Uizited States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686

i

(1 992), and State v. Davis, szipva. Both Doggett and Dcivis recognize that anxiety and

I

uncertainty during a long delay awaiting trial are prejudicial. I11 Doggett, in fact, the case tunled

I

in part upon the question of whether there can be a speedy trial violation when there is neither
pre-trial i~lcarcerationor anxiety and uncertainty because the defendant is not aware of the delay
in bringing him to trial. And, Davis involved a case like this one wherein there was 110 claim
made that delay had eroded a defense. Yet, Davis does not simply dismiss the question of
prejudice as urged by the state in this case. Rather, Davis states that "the presumption of

prejudice occasioned by the length of the delay, the ordinary nature of the case, and Davis's
anxiety are to be balanced against the reason for the delay and Davis's assertion of her right lo a
speedy trial." 141 Idaho at 173, 118 P.3d at 841.
The delay in this case did cause prejudice and that prejudice should be weighed in favor
of finding a violation of the constitutional rights to speedy trial.
It must also be noted that the Respondent has asserted in a footnote to its argument about
prejudice that Mr. Moore's claims on appeal should be rejected because, according to the state,
Mr. Moore failed to provide a complete record in this Court. Respondent's Brief, p. 1I , ftnt. 3.
This assertion itself should be rejected by this Court. As set out above, tlze doc~unentsthe state
claims are inissing froin the appellate record are in fact in the Clerk's Record.
5 . Weighing the liac~oi~s

In this case, there was a significant delay. The cause of the delay was the state's laclc of
diligence in researching Mr. Moore's prior history and the fact that the trial was scheduled lo
accommodate the calendar of one ofthe state's witnesses. Mr. Moore never waived his right to
speedy trial and did assert that right in the fonll of a motion to dismiss. And, there was prejudice
as Mr. Moore was forced to endure a very lengthy period of anxiety and uncertainty. The stale
asserts that on balance, this Court should find no constitutional violation, noting "[tlhe delay was

relatively short." Respondent's Brief, p. 12. The state nlight see a wait of nearly 2 years -in
fact, Mr. Moore was not sentenced until January 5,2009,2 years and 5 months after he was
arrested, as "relatively short." But, it tluly is a long period oftirne. Weighing all the Barlcer
factors, this Court should properly find that there was a violation of the state and federal
constitutions.

B. The Delay in this Case also Violated the Statutorv Right to Speedy Trial
The delay in this case violated the state and federal constitutional rights to speedy trial. It
also violated the statutoly right to speedy trial.
As Mr. Moore set out in the Opening Brief, there was no good cause for the delay in this
case. Neither the state's lack of diligence in ascertaining Mr. Moore's history nor the setting of a
trial around a state's witness's schedule constitute good cause. State v Clark, 135 Idaho 255,
260, 16 P.3d 931, 936 (2000). And, given there was no good cause, I.C. 5 19-3501 requires
dismissal of the case
The state has pointed out that the Opening Brief does not specify a subsection of I.C. §
19-3501. Mr. Moore's motion to dismiss in the District Court cited subsection 4 of the statute,
aiid that subsection should have been cited in theOpening Brief. R 36.
I.C.

19-3501(4) states:

The couii, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution
or indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases:

(4) If a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has not been
postponed ul~onhis application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from
the date that the defendant enters a plea of not guilty with the court.
This section is applicable because Mr. Moore was charged with a misdemeanor and
entered a not guilty plea on September 5, 2006. R 3, 11. By the tiine Mr. Moore filed his motion
to dismiss, his trial was set for Febnlary 15,2008. R 4, 36. Clearly, the state had not brought
Mr. Moore to trial within six months of his guilty plea. In fact, to meet the statutory speedy trial
requirement, Mr. Moore would have had to have been brought to trial by March 5,2007. I.C. 5

'The state has argued in a footnote, without citation to authority other than the statute
itself, that because it amended the charge to a felony after the mnning of the stat~ttoryspeedy trial
time limit, this Caul? should apply subsection (1) of the statute instead of subsection (4).
Respondent's Brief, p. 13. See, TAR 35(b)(6) (respondent's argument shall contain contentions
of respondent with citations to authorities). In a way, this argument by the state is irrelevant to
the final resolution of this case, because there was a speedy trial violation under both subsections.
Note that the state admits that the subsection (I) was violated, but argues that it had good cause
for the violation. Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Ilowever, it should also be noted that there is no
case law which would strpport the state's position that it can amend its way out of a speedy trial
problem under subsection (4). To the extent that the state seeks a new rule as to the application
of suhsect~ons(1) and (4), this is foreclosed by State v. McICeetlz, 136 Idaho 619, 627, 38 P.3d
1275,1283 (Ct. App. 2001). Appellant's Opening Brief, 12 - 13
More relevant to the resolution of this case is this: once the six month time limit has
expired, the District Court is required to dismiss the case unless there is a showing of good cause.
I.C. $ 19-3501. See illso, State v. Dillai,cl, sz~pra,holding that 1.C. 5 19-3501 is self-executing
As set oat in the Opening Brief, there was not good cause to avoid disniissal of the case.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12 - 14.
The state has argued in response:
Ilere the delay between the arrest and the filing of the infoimation was caused by
the state's failure to lea111 of the underlying convictions supporting the felony
charge. (R., pp. 110-11 (delay caused by "prosecution's delayed research into the
defendant's liistory of DUIs.")[)]. Once the state did ltnow of the prior
convictions it amended the conlplaint and sought to file the information. (Id.) The
fact that the state learned llzal the DUI in questioiz was a felony more than six
inonths after Moore's' (sic) arvest, vegardless ofthe reason for when the state so

leavnecl, is good causefor izoljiling an infovmalion within siw months o f the
arrest.

..

Respondent's Briel; p. 14 (emnpliasis added).
And, that is the state's argument. There is no citation to authority for this proposition nor
even any explanation given for it, logical or othe~wise.And, in fact, there is no citation to
authority, because, at least so far as Appellant can find, there has never been a case that has held
that the state may be as dilatory as it wishes in determining whether to amend a charge from a
misdemeanor to a felo~lywithout violating tlie statutory right to speedy trial. And, in fact, there
is 110 logical explanation, at least that Appellant can identify, that would allow the state to arrest
solneoiie a i d then fail to investigate the case so as to allow filing of an iizfo~~natio~i
within the .
statutory speedy trial provision. To adopt the state's position would be to conlpletely negate
subsectio~i(1) ofthe statute.
In the District Court, Mr. Moore argued for dismissal under I.C.

19-3501(4). And, the

state has argued here that subsection (1) is applicable. Regardless of which subsection is applied,
as the state itsclfadmits, the case was suhject lo dis~nissalunder I.C. 5 19-3501 in the absence of
a showing of good cause to avoid the statutory time limits.' And, as there was no good cause, the
case should have bee11 dismissed by the District Court.

111. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Moore requests that this
Court find that the District Gout erred in denying his motion to dismiss for constitutional and
statutory speedy trial violations.
Mr. Moore also requests, for the reasons set h r t h in case No. 35486, that if relief is
granted i11 that case, this case also be renianded for further proeeediilgs as ~ntendedby the District
Court.

IF
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